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COURT OF APPEALS, 1959 TERM
to claim their privilege and were adjudged guilty of criminal contempt. The
Court of Appeals held that the defendants were guilty of criminal contempt
and that had they answered the questions of the Grand Jury they would have
obtained total immunity against any prosecution as to matters disclosed by
the testimony, except for perjury or contempt.
The Cioffi decision is based on the assumption that the defendants were
summoned as witnesses only, but even if the defendants could be considered
potential targets of the investigation, the decision in the instant case would
probably have been the same. The Steuding51 case holds that a potential de-
fendant does not have to claim his privilege in order to get immunity from
indictment based on incriminating testimony he might give; but the case does
not refer to contempt proceedings for failure to testify when he has obtained
immunity. Since the defendant is accorded automatic immunity, there is no
reason for him to refuse to testify since he would not be bearing witness against
himself, and a contempt proceeding for refusal to testify is proper.
It has been consistently said that the immunity granted must be as broad
as the privilege of silence which is destroyed.52 In People v. De Feo53 the
Court of Appeals decided that the immunity conferred under Section 2447
was not co-extensive with the constitutional protection against self-incrimination
because the grand jury limited the immunity to specific crimes, and as a result
the conviction of criminal contempt could not stand. However, when, as in In
re Cioffi, 54 Section 2447 is properly used it grants complete immunity, and is
sufficiently broad to protect against prosecution of all violations of the laws
of New York State.
ATTORNEY'S REFUSAL TO TESTIFY AT INQUIRY INTO UNETHICAL PRACTICES
GROUND FOR DISBARIMENT
After ordering a "Judicial Inquiry and Investigation" into the unethical
practices of certain attorneys,55 the Appellate Division disbarred the appellant
when he failed to answer relevant questions at the inquiry.55 The appellant
maintained that the disbarment order violated his privilege against self-incrim-
ination under Article 1 Section 6 of the New York Constitution. The issue
presented to the Court of Appeals in the case of In re Cohen57 was whether the
constitutional privilege against self-incriminati6n, which protects one against
criminal prosecution, also protects one from disciplinary action as a member of
the bar for failing to answer questions at a judicial inquiry. The Court of
Appeals55 affirmed the disbarment of the Appellate Division.
51. Supra note 49.
52. Matter of Doyle, 257 N.Y. 244, 177 N.E. 489 (1931).
53. Supra note 48.
54. Supra note 50.
55. N.Y. Judiciary Law § 90.
56. 9 A.D.2d 436, 195 N.YS.2d 990 (2d Dep't 1959).
57. 7 N.Y.2d 488, 199 N.YS.2d 658 (1960).
58. Ibid.
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The Court held that the appellant was not being disbarred because he
invoked his constitutional privilege. He had the right to assert the privilege
which could not be denied to any citizen. However, standing before the inquiry,
appellant was more than just a citizen; he was also a member of an honored
profession, an officer of the court.59 The court is charged by the New York
Legislature with the duty of supervising the ethical standards of the legal pro-
fession and is given the power, which it exercised in the present case, to dis-
cipline any member of the bar who refuses to cooperate with the court, particu-
larly where unethical practices are involved.0 0
It must be remembered that the holding of the present case applies only
to such a "Judicial Inquiry and Investigation," which is not an adversary pro-
ceeding. These proceedings are conducted solely for the puprose of maintaining
the dignity and honor of the profession.0 ' Membership in the bar is not a right
but a high privilege which is burdened with many exacting conditions,02 and
this membership may be revoked in order to show the public that a man is no
longer qualified to represent himself as an attorney6 3
In People ex rel. Karlin v. Culkin,e4 the Court noted in a dictum that the
lawyer, being an officer of the court, was required to cooperate with the court
in an inquiry, but that such cooperation was subject to his claim of privilege.
In a later case 65 the Court of Appeals held that disbarment was proper when
the constitutional privilege was employed in bad faith, but refused to pass on
the question of such an assertion in good faith, indicating that the dictum in
the Culkin case was not controlling. The cases of In re Kaffenburgh" and In
re Solvei 7 do not control the present case because of the variance in the fact
situations. Appellant relied heavily on In re EllisGs and In re Grae0 9 as sup-
porting his position. A strict reading of the Court of Appeal's holdings in those
cases, however, indicates that "the single question of law" decided was that a
refusal by an attorney to sign a waiver of immunity at a judicial inquiry similar
to the present one did not constitute conduct warranting disciplinary proceed-
ings reasonably feared that criminal prosecution might follow. The Appellate
Division in In re Ellis7" clearly held that a good faith refusal to answer based
on the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination constituted professional
59. People ex rel. Karlin v. Culkin, 248 N.Y. 465, 162 N.E. 487 (1928).
60. In re Rouss, 221 N.Y. 81, 116 N.E. 782 (1917); Canons of Professional Ethics,
Canon 22.
61. In re Branch, 178 App. Div. 585, 165 N.Y. Supp. 688 (Ist Dep't 1917).
62. In re Rouss, supra note 60.
63. Theard v. United States, 354 U.S. 278 (1957).
64. Supra note 5 at 471, 162 N.E. at 489.
65. In re Levy, 255 N.Y. 223, 174 N.E. 461 (1931).
66. 188 N.Y. 49, 80 N.E.2d 802 (1907). (Attorney who is a witness at a trial may
not be disbarred for invoking constitutional privilege.)
67. 276 N.Y. 647, 12 N.E.2d 802 (1938). (Attorney who testifies before a grand jury
may not be disbarred for refusing to sign a waiver of immunity.)
68. 282 N.Y. 435, 26 N.E.2d 967 (1940).
69. 282 N.Y. 428, 26 N.E.2d 963 (1940).
70. 258 App. Div. 558, 17 N.Y.S.2d 800 (2d Dep't 1940).
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misconduct, but the Court of Appeals never passed on this specific issue in
its opinion.
As a result of the present Court of Appeal's decision, the attorney is placed
in a dilemma, for if he speaks he may be criminally prosecuted as well as dis-
barred; if he remains silent, he may also be disbarred. To say that one has a
fundamental constitutional privilege, but that if he exercises it he'will be dis-
missed from his position, as the Court of Appeals is saying, is to place a pre-
mium on his exercises of that privilege.7 '
Judge Fuld, dissenting in the present case, argued that the mere exercise of
a constitutional privilege, standing alone, was not grounds for disbarment.
There must be other independent evidence. If that evidence indicated that
appellant was guilty of professional misconduct, a disbarment proceeding
based on the damaging evidence should be instituted. If the appellant again
refused to testify, this other evidence would then be construed most strongly
against him. The Court's decision, however, appears sound, for the conduct of
attorneys should be subject to effective regulation by the courts of which
they are officers.
Recent developments in the law indicate also that when a person occupies
a position of public trust and responsibility, which requires a high degree of
moral character, such a person may be removed from his position, if he elects
to assert his constitutional privilege instead of answering questions asked for
the purpose of determining his character and fitness for his position.72 This
proposition is best illustrated by several recent United States Supreme Court
cases.73 Although a full discussion of these cases is beyond the scope of this
note, it may be observed that the Supreme Court is divided as to whether a
public employee who invokes his constitutional privilege of self-incrimination
may be discharged from public employment. Most of these cases have involved
the refusal to testify regarding activities in the Communist Party, and the
Court has refused to unequivocally state that the dismissal occurred because
of the invoking of the privilege. In Lerner v. Casey,74 for example, a subway
conductor was fired when he refused to testify regarding his present membership
in the Communist Party. The. Court of Appeals, with Justices Fuld and Van
71. In re Holland, 377 Ill. 346, 36 N.E.2d 543 (1941).
72. Lerner v. Casey, 2 N.Y.2d 355, 161 N.Y.S.2d 7 (1957), aff'd 357 U.S. 399
(1958); Beilan v. Board of Education, 357 U.S. 399 (1958) (a teacher, who invoked
Fifth Amendment, dismissed on ground that he was incompetent to teach under a Penn-
sylvania statute); Christal v. Police Comm. of San Francisco, 33 Cal. App. 2d 564, 92 P.2d
416 (1939) (a policeman dismissed on the ground that the invoking of the constitutional
privilege was inconsistent with his duty as a police officer).
73. Nelson v. Los Angeles County, 362 U.S. 1 (1960) (a county employee dismissed
on ground of insubordination); Lerner v. Casey, supra note 72; Beilan v. Board of Educa-
tion, supra note 72. See also Slochower v. Board of Education, 350 U.S. 551 (1956) in
which a statute interpreted to mean "assertion of the privilege against self-incrimination is
equivalent to resignation" was held to deprive a professor, who had invoked the Fifth
Amendment before a Congressional committee investigating subversive influences in
education, of due process of law.
74. 2 N.Y.2d 355, 161 N.YS.2d 7 (1957).
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Voorhis dissenting, held that the man was not fired because of any inference
that he was a member of the Communist Party, nor because he invoked the
Fifth Amendment, but because of the doubt created in the mind of his employer
as to his reliability. The Supreme Court affirmed this decision."
In the present case, duty required the attorney to answer: privilege per-
mitted him to decline to answer. The exercising of the privilege, however, was
entirely inconsistent with his duty as a member of the bar, and the violation
of his duty constituted cause for disbarment. 6
E IGHT LIGHTs Dnxrmo STATUTE HELD NOT VAGUE
New York Vehicle and Traffic Law Section 375(3) states:
"... whenever a vehicle approaching from ahead is within five hun-
dred feet ... the headlamps, if of the multiple beam type, shall be
operated so that dazzling light does not interfere with the driver of
the approaching vehicle. .2
In People v. Meola"7 the constitutionality of this section was put in ques-
tion. Defendant was convicted in the Court of Special Sessions of the Town
of Newburg for failing to dim her headlights.
On alpeal defendant made two contentions. First, that the statute in
question is constitutionally vague insofar as the phrase "dazzling light" is in-
capable of any objective measurement, and is thereby meaningless as to
furnishing the citizen a standard of required conduct. Secondly, the term
"interferes" is indefinite and makes criminality depend entirely on the sub-
jective effect of the light upon the complainant.
The judgment was reversed in County Court,78 on the grounds that the
rules of criminal law are applicable to statutes which create traffic infractions,70
and as such this statute was vague and failed to give the required warning to
citizens as to what constitutes a violation of the law.80 The clarity of the
offense described by a criminal statute raises a constitutional question since
it is one of the requirements of the due process guarantee.81
Upon petition of the Attorney General in his statutory capacity,8 2 the
case was reviewed by the Court of Appeals.
The Court answered defendant's first contention by stating that vagueness
only resulted when the phrase "dazzling light" was isolated from the overall
context of the statute. The proscribed conduct of the accused is the operation
of multiple beam headlamps so as to produce dazzling light. Read in its en-
tirety this can have but one meaning which the average citizen would so under-
75. 357 U.S. 468 (1958).
76. Christal v. Police Comm. of San Francisco, supra note 72.
77. 7 N.Y.2d 391, 198 N.Y.S.2d 276 (1960).
78. 19 Misc. 2d 837, 194 N.Y.S.2d 823 (County Ct. 1959).
79. People v. Hildebrandt, 308 N.Y. 397, 126 N.E.2d 377 (1955).
80. People v. Firth, 3 N.Y.2d 472, 168 N.Y.S.2d 949 (1957).
81. Jordan v. DeGeorge, 341 U.S. 223 (1951).
82. N.Y. Executive Law § 71.
